Alaskan Cruise Ship Exercise 98
(AK Cruisex 98)

FORWARD

Prevention and Readiness are the best deterrents for mitigating the effects of major marine disasters. For this reason the Coast Guard, in cooperation with the cruise ship industry, the State of Alaska, and local communities, has sponsored cruise ship exercises in Southeast Alaska over the past several years. Alaskan Cruisex 98 featured a seminar format which was designed to work on developing solutions to known problems (i.e. lessons learned from past events and exercises) through presentations and open discussions among the participants. Over 90 representatives from 43 agencies/organizations participated in the seminar. The overall goal of the seminar was to create an understanding of the capabilities, perceived roles, and concerns of the response community at large.

This report is a comprehensive account of the discussions that occurred. Hopefully the contents will provide readers with a thorough understanding of the response organizations and issues involved when responding to cruise ship contingencies in Alaska. The individual sections were developed from a detailed stenographer's report, which was provided by Confidential Office Services of Juneau, and follow up research, which was conducted by CGD17 (mpc) (e.g. internet sites, diagrams, and statistics). Unresolved issues, which the participants raised during the discussions, are provided after the appropriate sections. Three additional sections that were not discussed during the seminar are also included in the report; American Red Cross, Cruise Ship Contingencies in Alaska (1993-1998), and a Reference List.

Please note that the contents of this report should not be considered as policy or sited as an authority for defining the response requirements of the participating organizations.

Questions, additions, and/or corrections regarding the content of this report are encouraged. Please contact CGD17 (mpc) in Juneau, AK at (907) 463-2208/2210.

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PREVENTION INITIATIVES

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A. Summary of Safety Standards/Initiatives
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C. The International Safety Management (ISM) Code
D. Human Error Factors

Speakers Included: CAPT Cees Delstra (Holland America Cruises), CAPT Graham Burton (Princess Cruises), Mr. Hans Antonsen (Southeast Alaska Pilots Association), CAPT John Bowdrie (Alaska Coastwise Pilots), and LT Gerald Achenbach (CG MSO Juneau).

The speakers presented numerous examples of existing standards and initiatives which help to ensure safe operations within the cruise ship industry.

A. Summary of Safety Standards/Initiatives:

1. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has established regulations & treaties that specify the safe operating standards for vessels (i.e. Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations). The International Safety Management (ISM) code is a new initiative under SOLAS which is further discussed in this section.
2. Industry sponsors annual navigation refresher training for its bridge teams.
3. Industry has sponsored "Bridge Resource Management" team training to strengthen bridge team and pilot relationships.
4. "English" has been established as the standard working language for all ship board operations in Alaska (e.g. Contingency Drills and Bridge Navigation). This is verified by the CG during drills and inspections.
5. Cruise Line Agency of Alaska (CLAA) produces an annual information package for cruise ships operating in Alaska.
6. Voyage planning meetings are conducted prior to getting underway, which involve both the pilots and the entire bridge team.
7. Industry, pilot associations, and the CG have jointly participated in the development of the "Southeast Alaska Voluntary Waterways Guide" which defines the voluntary traffic management scheme in Southeast Alaska. The guide is updated annually and is published by CG MSO Juneau.
8. Masters and pilots have developed common passenger vessel tracklines.
9. Flag states maintain inspections and licensing program for shipboard personnel.
10. Industry maintains their own internal audit/inspection programs. These inspections are conducted at least annually.

11. Ships conduct internal inspection programs to check for potential hazardous situations and implement remedial actions.
12. The State requires two pilots to be on board passenger vessels while operating in the inside waters of Southeast Alaska. An exception to this is that only one pilot is required for an initial entry or final exit out to open sea when the voyage is expected to be less than eight hours. International law requires the master and/or the officer in charge of the navigational watch to cooperate closely with the pilots.
13. The State maintains an extensive licensing and training program for its pilots.
14. Pilot associations have bylaws that establish “standards of fatigue” guidelines for pilots (these standards have also been approved by the State). A 1997 Alaskan study showed pilots worked on the bridge an average of 6-1/2 hours per day. Currently pilots cannot spend more than 15 hours on watch within any 24-hour period and no more than 36 hours in any 72-hour period. The guidelines also relate the effects of diet, lifestyle, health, and sleep habits to the issue of "cumulative fatigue".
15. Pilot associations have developed and adopted standard master-pilot checklists.
16. Pilot associations conduct internal auditing and evaluation programs.
17. CG MSOs periodically inspect vessels' engineering systems, lifesaving systems, and human factor issues. In Alaska, passenger vessels are inspected quarterly (i.e. Control Verification Exams) for compliance with the international SOLAS regulations.
18. CG marine inspector qualifications are specified in accordance with the 1996 interagency report "Marine Safety Task Force Guidelines".
19. CG Officer in Charge Marine Inspection (OCMI) reports capture lessons learned from past inspections and incidences. These reports are periodically reviewed for changes to existing operations/regulations and summaries are distributed to the industry.

B. Summary of Contingency Measures:

1. Vessels conduct shipboard emergency drills (e.g. lifeboat drills).
2. Vessels maintain standard shipboard contingency plans.
3. Contingency plans for Alaska are kept at each cruise line's home office.
4. CG and State agencies, in cooperation with Industry, are developing procedures for a joint, initial response team called an "Away Team". This initiative is discussed in greater detail in the "Away Team" section of this report.
5. Industry, the CG, State, and local response agencies participate in contingency seminars and exercises (e.g. CG sponsored AK Cruisex 98).
6. Cruise lines have pre-established oil spill clean-up contractors for Southeast Alaska.
7. Vessels maintain Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans (SOPEP) in accordance with the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973/1978 (MARPOL). The SOPEP contains procedures for reporting oil

spill incidents and taking immediate action to mitigate the spill and coordinate clean-up activities.

8. Vessels maintain spill clean-up equipment onboard (limited to initial containment).

C. The International Safety Management (ISM) Code:

The ISM Code, which was developed by the IMO, recently established international standards for the safe operation of ships, establishment of pollution prevention capabilities, and implementation of safety management systems. All cruise ship companies are required to be in compliance by 01 July 1998. Issuance of the ISM Code gives shipping companies a baseline to develop their own safety management practices which cover their unique needs. Additional information about the code can be found online at the IMO webpage: www.imo.org.

General objectives of the code:

- Ensure safety.
- Prevent injury or loss of life.
- Avoid damage to the environment and to property.
- Ensure a safe [and high quality] cruise experience for passengers.

Specific objectives of the code (examples):

- Provide for safe practices in the operation of ships.
- Provide for a safe working environment and safe work practices for the crew.
- Provide a drug-free workplace for the crew.
- Establish safeguards against identified risks (i.e. conduct risk assessment planning).
- Continually improve safety management skills of ship personnel, both afloat and ashore, including preparations for emergencies related to both safety and environmental protection.
- Reduce accident potential through better health conditions for the crew.
- Improve waste management and hazardous waste materials handling on ships.
- Document, measure, and validate compliance with laws, rules and regulations as set by governments.

D. Human Error Factors:

The 1987 paper entitled *"Investigating Human Factors in Marine Casualties"* stated that human error is present in 90% of the groundings and 75% of collisions, fires, and explosions which occur in the marine industry.

This paper was provided to the seminar participants, copies are available from CGD17 (mpc).

THE UNIFIED COMMAND (UC) CONCEPT

Sections:

A. Incident Command System (ICS)
B. Unified Command (UC)
C. Unresolved Issues
D. UC Diagram - Cruise Ship Response (CG proposed)

Speakers Included: CDR Jean Butler (Chief of the 17th Coast Guard District Plans & Exercise Branch) and LCDR Dave Stalfort (Executive Officer of CG MSO Juneau).

A. ICS:

An Incident Command System (ICS) organization is based on five management functions that are common to every response:

- Leadership … (Command Section)
- Management of Field Operations … (Operations Section)
- Establishment Long Term Objectives and Goals … (Planning Section)
- Acquisition of Resources … (Logistics Section)
- Obligation and Tracking of Funds … (Finance Section)

The strength of an ICS organization is that it's staffing requirements can be flexible (i.e. based on the demands of the incident) while also effectively managing the five functions. One member can start the organization (i.e. handling all five functions) and additional personnel can be called in to handle the separate functions if workloads increase. The common understanding of the organization facilitates the transition from one person to many. Basic training in ICS further allows for a defined decision-making process, clarification of responsibilities, reasonable workloads (i.e. span-of control), common terminology, and standardization of required forms.

B. UC:

Representatives from different organizations can easily merge into a Unified Command (UC) if they already understand and/or utilize an ICS organization.

A UC is ideally suited to coordinate response issues that involve multiple jurisdictions, coordination of resources, establishment of common objectives, etc.. Cruise ship contingency examples might include:

- Establishment of viable communications from on-scene to shore
- Development of consistent media information
- Coordination of passenger transport and support issues ashore
- Coordination of safe operating guidelines for air assets which arrive on-scene
- Addressing concerns regarding vessel movement (e.g. harbor of safe refuge vs. environmental impacts)
- Mobilization of long-term resources (e.g. for oil spill response, salvage operations, etc.)

In order to legitimize the UC, it is vital that the responsible party, lead state response organization, and the CG each provide a knowledgeable and empowered representative to the Command Section of the organization. These representatives are commonly referred to as Qualified Individuals (QIs).

During the initial notification phase, in which details may be sketchy, the QIs and a limited support staff coordinate as an Incident Management Team (IMT) to assess the situation. If the incident were serious the IMT would then mobilize their organizations to form a UC.

The UC members generally relocate from their parent organizations to a pre-designated Unified Command Post (UCP). While each organization in the UC is not expected to place their entire response organization at the UCP, there must be sufficient representation to facilitate joint decision-making and coordination of activities.

During the seminar CG MSO Juneau provided a draft UC diagram for a cruise ship response. The diagram has been recreated and is provided in part D of this section.

C. Unresolved Issues:

- For the UC to work each cruise line needs to identify "Qualified Individuals (QIs)" who can represent them during the first 24 hours of a response. Ideally this person would already work in Alaska so that they could get to the UCP within a few hours. Currently bulk fuel carriers are required by the Oil Pollution Act 0f 1990 (OPA-90) to have QIs (i.e. somebody who is in a location where the vessel operates who can fit into the UC, who can make decisions, can allocate resources and spend money). Cruise Line Agency of Alaska (CLAA) was suggested by the CG as a possible Industry source for this person.

- The CG needs to ensure that coordination between the cruise line's crisis action center (i.e. located at their out-of-state headquarters) and the UC is established during the initial response. This is vitally important should an industry QI not be immediately available in Alaska. During past exercises the CG has neglected to establish this link. Industry operates their crisis action centers 24 hours a day during contingencies. The main industry decision-makers, the people who can free up the money and have the authority to sign big checks, will be at the crisis action center.
- If the Industry QI is located initially at the cruise line's crisis action center, the CG requested that the responsibilities not shift from one person to another. In other words, when the UC calls the crisis action center they want to consistently deal with the same person.
- UCPs need to be identified and tested in the major communities of Southeast Alaska.
- For a UCP in Juneau, Centennial Hall Convention Center was discussed as a possible location. This facility is well suited for a command post. Unfortunately, this facility was also discussed as a potential shelter for the passengers and crew while they await air transport to the Lower-48. The co-location of the UCP and the shelter may complicate the operations of the UC.
- Having reviewed the draft UC Diagram, the Alaska Division of Emergency Services (ADES) recommended that the "Survivor Processing Unit" be renamed to the "Evacuation/Disembarkation Processing Unit".
- It was recommended that Protection and Indemnity (P&I) representatives be incorporated into the IMT structure, as they will require early access to the vessel.

D. UC Diagram - Cruise Ship Response (CG proposed):



THE SCENARIO (Glacier Bay, Alaska)

Sections:

A. Area Overview
B. Detailed Scenario
C. Industry's Concerns Regarding the Accuracy of the Scenario

Speakers Included: Mr. Chuck Young (District Ranger at Glacier Bay National Park (GBNP)), CAPT Cees Delstra (Holland America Cruises), and CDR Dave Eley (Commanding Officer of CG MSO Juneau).

The possible reasons and likelihood for the event describe below were not presented. The purpose of the scenario was to generate a broad discussion of response options if such an event had occurred. To ensure a "best outcome", the scenario discussions required cooperation, professionalism, communications, and awareness from all the groups represented at the seminar.

A. Area Overview:

- Remote - not accessible by road, rescue or safety resources not locally available.
- Communications - often spotty or non-existent.
- Environment - harsh and unforgiving, lots of navigational hazards, weather can be extreme and changes quickly.
- Natural Resources - near pristine conditions.
- Traffic - a way point with a lot of traffic going in and out night and day.

B. Detailed Scenario:

- Event - a cruise ship grounds at Jaw Point (Johns Hopkins Inlet) Glacier Bay National Park.
- The cruise ship is an 800-foot vessel with 1,800 passengers and 700 crewmembers aboard. Damage to the hull below the waterline occurs and approximately 100,000 gallons of bunker C fuel is spilled. The vessel lists to port. Numerous passengers have complained of miscellaneous injuries. Four heart attacks have been reported.
- The incident occurs on May 20, 1998 at 12:00 noon. Sunrise occurred at 4:20 a.m. and sunset will occur at about 9:30 p.m. (approximately 9 hours of daylight left).
- Tides will be ebbing at 12:00 p.m. High tide was at 9:11 a.m. and low tide will occur at 3:45 p.m..

- Two other cruise ships are scheduled in Glacier Bay that day (times & vessels not specified). Private vessel traffic will be relative light. Tour boats and three charter boats are operating in Glacier Bay that day (companies not specified). In addition, there may be kayakers, campers, and a research group near the glacier.
- At Jaw Point, the inlet is about a mile wide, the shoreline is very steep and rocky, the depth of the water is very deep (19-203 fathoms), and lots of ice may be present in the water.
- Weather is generally mild at this time of May. The general prevailing wind is from the south, but in the evening the wind changes to push things out of Johns Hopkins Inlet.
- The closest developed area is Bartlett Cove, the Park administrative headquarters, 49 nautical miles to the southeast. Gustavus, with a population of 300-350 people, is 56 nautical miles to the southeast. Juneau is approximately 115 nautical miles by boat and about 41 miles by air to the southeast. Haines is 60 miles by air to the northeast.
- Communications are extremely limited. As a line-of-sight system, Marine VHF traffic would not be able to reach up into Jaw Point, except by relaying transmissions from ship to ship. The Parks Service maintains a radio network in the bay, but it will not reach from Bartlett Cove headquarters to Jaw Point without being relayed through another vessel. Cell phone coverage is only available near the mouth of the bay. Satellite phone coverage is possible but can be unreliable due to masking of the satellite by mountains.
- Sea wildlife consists of harbor seals, lots of nesting and feeding birds, orca whales, harbor porpoises, and occasional humpback whales. Land mammals are bears, mountain goats and wolves.
- GPNP has a special regulation in place from May 1 to August 31 that bans vessel traffic in Johns Hopkins Inlet from Jaw Point inland to protect a large population of harbor seals that pup there in May and early June.

C. Industry's Concerns Regarding the Accuracy of the Scenario:

CAPT Delstra (paraphrased summary):

During the planning stage of this exercise … we jointly picked Glacier Bay, being one of the most pristine areas in the world, in order to generate a wide array of discussion topics. But I'd like to say a few things about the modern cruise industry and the ships that visit Glacier Bay as a "reality check" for this scenario.

Foremost the cruise ship industry, as a whole, is very safety-focused as we discussed earlier in the "Prevention Initiatives" session. We go to 250 to 300 different ports a year around the world and conduct detailed risk assessments of the areas we operate in.

In this scenario we scripted that 100,000 gallons (i.e. approximately 380 tons) of Bunker C fuel was released into the water. This release is unlikely for the following reasons:

- Bunker C is seldom used onboard modern cruise ships.

  Holland America, for example, uses a much lighter fuel due to the sensitivity of the area and to alleviate other problems such as smoke emissions. Therefore, what you would get in the water is a little easier to deal with than Bunker C. I don't mean to say that cleanup would not be an issue, but lighter fuels are easier to deal with.

- The damage caused by a cruise ship grounding at Jaw Point would be limited.

  There are 20 fathoms of water under the keel. The most likely damage to the ship would be a few broken portholes if the vessel drifted against a mountainside. It becomes different of course when you're running 20 miles per hour and develop a problem. But again it is very unlikely to have a situation like this at Jaw Point.

- The amount of fuel in the water is not realistic.

  In this particular scenario, it would take the rupturing over a quarter the vessel's fuel tanks (i.e. 5-6 of 16 tanks) to release the scenario's 380 tons of fuel. Since there are no underwater obstructions at Jaw Point and the ship is doing almost no speed (i.e. maybe one or two knots while turning around) the fuel tanks could not be ruptured.

    - Fuel is typically stored onboard cruise ships in double wall tanks which are located in the center of the vessel. Smaller ships typically have 8-10 different tanks where this amount of fuel is divided from the bow to the stern. Larger ones can have up to 16 tanks. The wing tanks on the bottom are the water ballast tanks.

    - Depending on the size of the vessel, the amount of fuel on board a fully "topped off" cruise ship is somewhere between 1,100 tons and 1,700 tons of fuel. Cruise ships typically operate on a two-week cycle, which means at the beginning of the cycle the ship leaves with two weeks of fuel onboard — big ones, 1,700 tons onboard, the smaller ones about 1,100 tons onboard. The smaller ones burn about 55 tons per day. The bigger ones can burn up to 100 tons per day. So once they get to Glacier Bay, approximately 30-40% of this fuel is already burned (i.e. leaving 1000-1200 tons onboard).

INDUSTRY'S RESPONSE TO THE SCENARIO

Sections:

A. Cruise Line Agency of Alaska (CLAA) Response
B. Cruise Line Operator's Response (Holland America)
C. Industry's Response Diagram

Speakers Included: Mr. Kris Geldaker (CLAA) and CAPT Cees Delstra (Holland America Cruises).

A. CLAA Response:

CLAA is the local support agent for cruise ship operations in Alaska. During contingency situations, CLAA receives initial information from the affected ship or the cruise line's home office.

CLAA's initial response would include the following actions:

- CLAA's home office in Ketchikan would anticipate initial notification of the incident via their 24-hour phone line (available to industry).
- The Ketchikan office would act as the "coordinating office" for the cruise line's in-state response.
- The coordinating office would determine and establish a viable communications link with the distressed vessel. Communications may have to be relayed through another industry vessel operating in the vicinity of the incident.
- Initial information gathered from the distressed vessel would include the following:

    - Determine immediate medical needs for the passengers/crew.
    - Determine additional support needs for passengers/crew (supplies, people, air evacuation, etc.).
    - Determine status of the passengers and crew — are they at muster stations, are they in boats, and do they have essential medications with them?
    - Determine the ship's environmental condition (e.g. Is it listing, sinking, able to maneuver? Is there oil in the water?).
    - What has the ship done with its onboard response equipment (e.g. Is the onboard boom deployed, where is it deployed, and is it holding?)?
    - Determine what notifications the ship has made (e.g. their home office, CG, National Park Service (NPS), Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), etc.).

- Make additional notifications for the distressed vessel if necessary. CLAA has the 24-hour phone numbers for each cruise line home office and the local/state/federal responders.
- Determine if another cruise ship is near to the distressed vessel. Another cruise ship would be the greatest asset for evacuating people.
- For a Glacier Bay scenario, request a waiver of vessel speed restrictions from the Park Service.
- Determine what other industry vessels are operating in the area. What kind of communications do they have? How close are they? What kind of assistance are they able to bring, both for passengers and for environmental concerns?
- Check the local weather forecast.
- Check the ice conditions.
- Explore air access for floatplanes; get necessary permits and determine on-scene limitations for landing floatplanes (e.g. sea conditions).
- Coordinate access to industry funding sources.
- Coordinate with the Juneau Airport for the arrival of aircraft from the Lower-48 (for passenger transport out of the Juneau area). The cruise operator's home office would be arranging for aircraft to pick up passengers following their safe arrival in Juneau.
- Act as the coordination point for local vendors wanting to offer assistance/assets.
- Coordinate media relations through the Federal/State Unified Command Post (UCP).
- Initial Personnel Assignments:

    - Send an experienced CLAA person to the UCP.
    - Get CLAA's Juneau office geared up with extra support**.**
    - Send a CLAA representative to the health care providers which are/will be receiving passenger/crew initially taken off the distressed ship (i.e. emergency medical cases initially handled by search and rescue resources).
    - Send a CLAA representative to the scene of the incident to liaison with CLAA offices and the cruise line's home office.
    - At the direction of the cruise line's home office, take a protection & indemnity (P&I) representative to the incident scene.
    - Send a CLAA representative to SEAPRO's Ketchikan office to coordinate necessary oil spill response activities (i.e. the local Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO)).
    - Have a trained recorder in CLAA's Ketchikan office to log events as they happen.

B. Cruise Line Operator's Response (Holland America):

Each year approximately 21 major cruise ships, of 1,000 to 3,000 passengers and crew (e.g. the *Norwegian Wind* at 2,380 persons), and 17 minor cruise ships, of 60 to 900 passengers and crew (e.g. the *Spirit of Endeavour* at 137 persons), operating in Southeast Alaska. Approximately 14 separate cruise lines (e.g. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line) operate these vessels. For the Port of Juneau these vessels account for approximately 550 separate portcalls each summer.

The actions outline below are a presentation of what Holland America's initial actions would be during an emergency. Holland America currently operates six vessels of 1,500+ passengers and crew in Alaska each summer. Other major cruise operators, which were in attendance, agreed that they follow similar emergency procedures.

Holland America's initial response would include the following actions:

- Holland America's home office in Seattle, WA would anticipate initial notification of the incident via their 24-hour duty officer phone line**.**
- Internal notifications would take place (i.e. the company chairman/president, CAPT Delstra, and the marine operations department). The company's emergency response plan would be activated.
- Company personnel would then be immediately notified to man the crisis action center in Seattle. The crisis action center includes computers, tidal information, stability programs for their ships, and a myriad of phone lines.
- The initial crisis action team would meet to assess the situation and decide who will be sent to the scene and how quickly they could get there.
- The initial crisis action team would also notify the company's insurance agent, legal counsel, and the National Response Center (NRC) in Washington, D.C..

  The NRC is the sole federal point of contact for reporting oil and chemical spills. The NRC is staffed by CG personnel who maintain a 24-hour per day, 365 day per year telephone watch. NRC watch standers enter telephonic reports of pollution incidents into the Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) and immediately relay each report to the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The NRC also provides emergency response support to the FOSCs. This includes extensive reference materials, state of the art telecommunications and operation of automated chemical identification and chemical dispersion information systems. If you have a spill to report, contact the NRC toll-free at **1-800-424-8802.** For additional information check out their web site at: www.nrc.uscg.mil.

- A second crisis action team would be formed to handle travel logistics involved in disembarking the passengers/crew to a local community (likely 1200-1300 people). This team has 24-hour phone numbers for airlines, which have plans in place to conduct an airlift from Alaska to the Lower-48.
- The company has its own logistics division in Juneau (i.e. Gray Line of Alaska), a tour bus company, which would coordinate movement of passengers once ashore. The company is also affiliated with the Westmark Hotels throughout Alaska.

Princess Tours, a division of Princess Cruises, and Gray Line of Alaska also have extensive resources in Skagway and Ketchikan.

- A 800 number would be established to address family member inquires about passenger/crew onboard the ship.

C. Industry's Response Diagram (based on seminar presentations):



GLACIER BAY NATIONAL PARK'S RESPONSE TO THE SCENARIO

Sections:

A. Initial Response
B. Extended Response
C. National Park Service's Response Diagram - Glacier Bay

Speaker: Mr. Chuck Young (District Ranger at Glacier Bay National Park (GBNP))

The Park Service's response to the scenario was based on the assumption that their personnel would likely be the first notified and among the first to arrive on-scene.

A. Initial Response:

Communications. Provided the ship cannot communicate directly to the outside world, information of the incident may be relayed through another ship in the area. The ship might also contact the park headquarters at Bartlett Cove directly since each ship has a park naturalist onboard who does have a radio.

Incident Management Team (IMT). The Park Service trains and maintains an IMT to deal with this type of emergency. The team is made up of field staff from throughout Alaska and has been deployed before to Glacier Bay and other parks. Initially, the IMT would set up its own incident command system at Bartlett Cove. As the incident grew, it would incorporate its system into the larger picture by sending a representative to the Unified Command Post (UCP), presumably in Juneau.

Response Assets.

- The Park Service maintains a fixed-wing aircraft that it could deploy to the area to size up the situation and pass the information on to the IMT and UCP. The plane could also serve as a communications link if it remained on-scene.
- Rangers would be on patrol in the area and might be able to provide an initial link to the grounded ship. In addition, these patrols could assist with in-water rescues, if necessary.

B. Extended Response:

Communications.

- The IMT would provide an ongoing communications link between on-scene personnel and UPC.
- The Park Service has scoped out several possible sites for a repeater in the event one is ever needed (VHF and satellite communications).
- The IMT communications priorities would be to relay human casualty information, pinpoint the incident location, and obtain sea state and weather condition observations.

Ship Evacuation. The IMT would assist in the evacuation of the ship with the limited resources available.

- Park Service personnel onboard the ship would contact the captain/master and would act as a liaison with the IMT.
- The IMT would provide local knowledge of suitable beaches where people could be put ashore and where staging areas could be set up.
- The IMT could coordinate assistance from other ships and boats in the area.
- Bartlett Cove and Gustavus would be recommended as locations for consolidating passengers until commercial aircraft could be brought in to pick them up (i.e. if another cruise ship was not available to transport the people).

    - Gustavus has an airport.
    - Bartlett Cove and Gustavus — although quite small — may be used as temporary shelters for evacuees where limited medical aid and food are available.

- The Park Service has a 26-foot Bertram that patrols Glacier Bay. The boat could assist in lighter people from the vessel.
- The Park Service could provide transportation services for other agencies and industry representatives who may need to get on-scene.

Natural Resource Monitoring and Mitigation. The IMT would coordinate efforts in conjunction with the State's Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) and the CG.

- Once the evacuation issues were resolved, the Park Service's large staff of resource experts would provide detailed natural resource information.
- The IMT would use its coastal mapping information to baseline natural resources locations, threatened areas, and wind/current trajectories.
- The IMT would provide booming support and recommendations to ADEC, the CG, and SEAPRO.

- Resource mitigation efforts for this scenario would be prioritized as follows:

    - Prevent the oil from going further back into Johns Hopkins Inlet to protect 3,000-4,500 harbor seals.
    - Prevent the oil from leaving Johns Hopkins Inlet.
    - Keep nesting birds out of the area.
    - Protect four local anadromous salmon streams.

- CG and ADEC equipment pre-staged at Bartlett Cove could be transported by helicopter to the incident site.

    - ADEC's local response conex.
    - CG's Conex with 1,000 feet of containment boom and absorbent material.

C. National Park Service's Response Diagram - Glacier Bay
(based on seminar presentations):



COAST GUARD'S RESPONSE TO THE SCENARIO

Sections:

A. CG Command & Control Organizations in Alaska
B. CG Response Focus
C. CGD17 (cc)'s Initial Actions
D. CG MSO Juneau's Initial Actions
E. CG's Response Diagram

Speaker: CDR Ross Tuxhorn (CGD17 (mor) Juneau) and LTjg Vivian Louie (CG MSO Juneau).

A. CG Command & Control Organizations in Alaska:

For major marine contingencies in Southeast Alaska two CG units have management responsibilities and authorities involving response efforts. They are the CG Command Center in Juneau {CGD17 (cc)} and the Marine Safety Office in Juneau (CG MSO Juneau). The direct supervisor of these units is the 17th Coast Guard District Commander, a rear admiral, who is also located in Juneau.

CGD17 (cc). CGD17(cc) manages the daily responsibilities and operations of the Northern Pacific SAR Coordinator (NPSC) for the 17th Coast Guard District Commander. The CGD17 Maritime Operations Response branch {CGD17 (mor)}, of the District Commander's staff, directly manages and supports CGD17 (cc) operations. In accordance with the National Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual and CG Pacific Area directives, CGD17 (cc) supervises all SAR operations within the NPSC area of responsibility (AOR). The NPSC AOR starts at the U.S./Canadian border in Southeast Alaska and covers Alaskan coastal waters out to the U.S./Russian border in the Aleutians. If for any reason the CGD17 (cc) is not operational, Commanding Officer, CG Air Station Kodiak shall temporarily assume the duties of NPSC and standup their Command Center.

CG MSO Juneau.

- As the Captain of the Port (COTP) for Southeast Alaska, the Commanding Officer of CG MSO Juneau is responsible for insuring that regulations for passenger vessel safety are being followed within the AOR (e.g. SOLAS Regulations - see the "Prevention Initiatives" section of this report). In this capacity the MSO is also

responsible for insuring that irregular passenger vessel operations do not unduly endanger the passengers/crew (e.g. the emergency disembarkation of passenger from a vessel in a remote location).

- As the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinate (FOSC) for oil spill response in Southeast Alaska, the Commanding Officer of CG MSO Juneau is also the lead federal responder for oil discharges occurring in the coastal zone. The FOSC is responsible for the coordination and direction of federal pollution control efforts at the scene of a discharge or potential discharge. Under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), the FOSC is charged with the direction and deployment of available resources to initiate and continue containment, countermeasures, clean up, and disposal functions. Regardless of the CG unit monitoring, supervising, or investigating a cleanup operation, the FOSC maintains the responsibility to ensure that the action taken is proper.

B. CG Response Focus:

- Initial SAR. Initially transport critically injured personnel from on-scene to the nearest medical facility.
- Away Team. Establish federal and state response representation on the vessel to verify conditions on the vessel and to facilitate requests for assistance from the vessel to the shore.
- Verification and stabilization of the vessel's casualty.
    - ♦ Verify the master's damage assessment of the vessel (e.g. Is flooding controlled, will stability issues become an issue, etc?)
    - ♦ Work with the vessel's master and crew to control further damage to the vessel.
- Control and Communications On-scene.
    - ♦ Establish a Forward Command Post (FCP) for CG operations, most likely on a CG cutter.
    - ♦ Establish a Unified Command Post (UPC) for oil spill response & salvage operations, coordination with shoreside passenger operations, and media relations.
    - ♦ Establish effective and reliable communications from the FCP to CGD17 (cc) and the UCP.
- Passenger Disembarkation.
    - ♦ Coordinate with master and cruise operator in initiating procedures to account for all the passengers and crew.

- ♦ Work with the cruise ship company to identify additional medical needs of the passengers and how best the CG can assist in meeting those needs.
- ♦ Verify and assist on-scene with the safe transfer of passengers to other vessels or to shore.

- Initial oil pollution mitigation efforts.

  - ♦ Verify that the source of the spill is secured and if necessary coordinate with the master to secure the source.
  - ♦ Verify that available containment boom has been properly deployed (if available on vessel).

- Pollution Response. Institute oil spill response measures in full compliance with the NCP and Alaska's Area Contingency Plan (ACP) for oil and hazardous substance discharge/releases (i.e. the Alaska Unified Plan). The Unified Plan can be viewed online at: www.akrrt.org/UnifiedPlan/unifplan.htm
- Vessel Salvage/Transit Plan. Coordinate the development and approval of required salvage and transit plans for the vessel. A sample salvage plan can be obtained via the internet from the CG's Marine Safety Center (MSC) at: www.uscg.mil/hq/msc/salvage.htm

C. CGD17 (cc)'s Initial Actions:

- Dispatch CG aircraft to the site of the incident for SAR, Away Team deployment, communications, UC overflights, and aircraft control.

  - ♦ CG AIRSTA Sitka maintains three H-60 helicopters. These aircraft are available for SAR, Away Team deployment, overflights, and installation of portable VHF-FM repeaters.
  - ♦ CG AIRSTA Kodiak maintains several C-130s which could be used for communications and aircraft control. Additional H-60 helicopters may be made available.

- Dispatch CG cutters to the site of the incident for SAR, damage assessment/assistance, communications, passenger disembarkation, FCP, aircraft control, and the deployment of oil spill equipment.

  - ♦ Several cutters operate in Southeast Alaska (e.g. 180-foot buoy tenders and 110-foot patrol craft). These can perform the operations above with the exception of aircraft control.
  - ♦ A High Endurance Cutter (i.e. WHEC 378' cutter) may be operating in the area. A 378' can perform the operations above and may be used for limited aircraft control.

- Notify the response community (i.e. the appropriate MSO, State agencies, etc.).
- Continually gather information on the vessel's situation.
- Coordinate medevac logistics with the vessel's medical staff, CG flight surgeon, and shoreside medical facilities.
- Activate CG personnel for augmenting CGD17 (cc) and the CG staff at the UCP.
- Activate the CG District Response Advisory Team (DRAT) for mobilization of CG pre-staged oil spill equipment. The CG maintains several sites with pre-staged oil spill response equipment in Southeast Alaska (i.e. currently in Ketchikan, Sitka, Petersburg, and Juneau).
- Coordinate logistics of additional SAR resources.
- Place MSC's Salvage Engineering Response Team (SERT) in standby for verification of hull stress and stability calculations.

  The SERT is comprised of 8-10 staff engineers who are on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assist and support Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTPs) when disaster strikes. SERT members are naval architects trained to conduct technical analysis in the areas of vessel stability and structural integrity. When activated, the salvage team provides technical support to the COTP during marine casualties: groundings, collisions, explosions, and fires. The team's members have strong credentials, including masters degrees in naval architecture, professional engineering licenses, and experience in commercial vessel design. Team members are expert users of several naval architecture software packages, including GHS and HECSALV. SERT members are selected from each of the three divisions and provide their service as a collateral duty.

D. CG MSO Juneau's Initial Actions:

- Verify the details of the incident through CGD17 (cc), the Park Service IMT, and CLAA's home office.
- Initiate notifications of other federal and state oil spill response organizations in accordance with the Alaska Unified Plan.
- Coordinate vessel movement issues with the master and cruise line operator (e.g. Harbor of Safe Refuge). The stability of the vessel, safety of potential passenger transfers, and the potential for further spreading of any oil would be factors.

  For the Glacier Bay Scenario: It was jointly agreed that it would be best to leave the damaged ship where it is until the oil leak could be stopped and the vessel is stabilized. The vessel could also be used as a boom, provided weather remained good.

- Provide CGD17 (cc) and on-scene CG units with 1st responder recommendations for securing the source of the pollution and protecting the environment from further impact.

- Initially establish a UCP at the MSO. The location would change depending on the management requirements of the incident. In Juneau, the Centennial Hall Convention Center would be a likely site for a large UCP.
- Designate an "Away Team" and coordinate its transportation to the vessel.
- Recall personnel, including reserves and auxiliary, and request personnel assistance from the District Staff as needed.
- Coordinate an overflight of the incident.
- Maintain constant contact with media and public relations representatives.
- Coordinate CG cutter support with CGD17 (cc) for on-scene support for passenger safety and deployment of oil spill equipment.
- Establish No Fly Zones, through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and/or Safety Zones as appropriate.
- Access the national Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF).
- Notify the CG National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC) and CG Pacific Strike Team (PST) and request additional personnel and resources as needed.
- Coordinate transportation of CG oil spill equipment as required from pre-staged locations.
- Coordinate additional assistance for transportation of oil spill equipment with the Alaska Division of Emergency Services (ADES).
- Request weather information from the National Weather Service (NWS).
- Identify sensitive areas which may be affected by the vessel and response operations.
- Request oil spill trajectory data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC). The SSC would provide expected trajectories for the oil spill after 6, 12, 24, and 48 hour periods.
- Coordinate with MSC for vessel stability issues and salvage plans.
- Establish a FCP and staging areas (as required).

  For the Glacier Bay Scenario: There would be a FCP on board a CG cutter or in Bartlett Cove at the Park Service's headquarters. Staging areas could possibly be located at Gustavus (because of its airport) and at Reid Inlet (the closest site to Johns Hopkins Inlet with a beaching area and a flat area to off-load equipment by helicopter). Queen Inlet would be a secondary location.

E. CG's Response Diagram (based on seminar presentations):



STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE SCENARIO

Sections:

A. Alaska Division of Spill Prevention and Response (SPAR)
B. Alaska Division of Emergency Services (ADES)
C. Division of Alaska State Troopers (AST)
D. Special Response Initiatives: Webpages & M/V Kennicott

Speakers Included: Mr. Ron Flinn (ADEC State On-Scene Coordinator (SOSC) for Southeast Alaska), Mr. Pete Petram (ADES, Anchorage), and SGT Paul Burke (AST - Anchorage), Mr. Bob Matson (ADEC), and CAPT Goerge Capacci (Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS)).

A. SPAR:

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), Division of Spill Prevention and Response (SPAR) is Alaska's primary response organization for oil and hazardous substance releases.

SPAR Responsibilities.
Program staff implement state law to protect public health and the environment from direct or indirect effects of spills. During responses they guard the safety of persons involved, ensure mitigation measures are in effect, and recover state-incurred costs to the Oil and Hazardous Substance Release Prevention and Response Fund (OHSRPRF).

SPAR Resources.

- The Commissioner of ADEC designates the State's On-Scene Coordinators (SOSCs), who are responsible for directing and coordinating the State's response to oil and hazardous substance discharges.
- SPAR has 120 employees trained to the 40 hour General Site Worker/HazMat Technician level.
- Response equipment containers are pre-staged in several Southeast Communities (e.g. Bartlett Cove, Juneau, Ketchikan, etc.). The equipment consists of 1000 feet of nearshore boom and absorbent pads for defensive/protective booming of sensitive areas.
- SPAR is preparing a strategic plan for the development of additional response resources. The department's nearshore response assets currently includes two high-speed response vessels (one in Ketchikan and one in Juneau) and a barge in Seldovia. Each of these locations maintains a skimmer package, boom, and storage capability.

SPAR Initial Response.

- The CG usually notifies SPAR of marine spills.
- The SPAR response staff would be activated and a representative would be at the Unified Command Post (UCP) within two hours.
- Internal SPAR management notifications would take place. The governor's office would be notified during this process.
- Other state agencies (e.g. ADES, ADF&G, Natural Resources, etc.) would be notified.
- The Away Team representative would be mobilized.
- Within six hours, a situation assessment would occur and SPAR would be able to activate additional internal staff and request personnel from other state agencies.
- For a remote location in Southeast Alaska, the availability of the *M/V Medea* would be requested from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G). The *Medea*, which is homeported in Juneau, is a 110-foot vessel which has good capabilities as a response platform or forward command post (FCP) for the state. It would take two to three hours to get the vessel away from the dock with initial supplies (e.g. skiffs, fuel, etc.) and another 10 -12 hours to reach an incident site in Glacier Bay.
- The availability of National Guard equipment (e.g. helicopters) would be requested.
- The availability of Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (AK DOT & PF) resources in Gustavus (e.g. maintenance equipment and personnel) would be requested.
- Tug support from local communities for vessel stabilization and/or movement would be requested.
- The State's "470 account", which pays for response measures (e.g. up to $25,000 for initial response), would be accessed. $50 million is available for state agency response.
- Within twelve hours, boom would be on-scene and defensive deployment in critical areas could commence. Though SPAR's primary role is oversight of the responsible party's response, it will also augment the responsible party's capability.
- A news release and initiating the posting of the Unified Command (UC) webpage would occur.

B. ADES:

The Department of Military and Veterans Affairs (DMVA), Division of Emergency Services (ADES) maintains and operates the State's Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) which is the focal point for coordinating state resources during a major contingency.

ADES Responsibilities.

- Keep the Governor's Office and other state agencies updated on contingency events within the state.
- Act as the conduit for the provision of State resources in an incident (i.e. National Guard Helos, State Ferries, etc.).

ADES Resources.
- Maintain contact information and data for requesting resources from other State agencies.
- Maintain and operate the State's Emergency Coordination Center (SECC) at Fort Richardson, Anchorage, AK (Anchorage). The SECC duty officer can be reached 24 hours a day at **1-800-478-2337**.

ADES Initial Response.
- Upgrade the watch status at the SECC.
- Begin to collect incident data to brief the governor's office.
- Coordinate requests for State equipment resources.

When resources, such as the *M/V Kennicott* or the National Guard's Black Hawk helicopters, become known to responders they often request the use of specific equipment to meet response needs. However, these requests are often not the most effective way for the State to allocate its limited and costly resources. ADES's job is to determine how to best meet the responder's requests while efficiently allocating State resources. To assist in this effort, requests to ADES should only include the mission/task the responder needs accomplished. ADES can then find the most appropriate cost-effective resource.

C. AST:

The Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Public Safety (DPS) is the civil authority for Search and Rescue (SAR) in the State of Alaska. SAR coordination with state agencies is managed through the Department's Division of Alaska State Troopers (AST).

AST Responsibilities.
- For a major cruise ship emergency, AST consider themselves a secondary response agency since their training/expertise is primarily for land-based SAR.
- If fatalities occur, AST is the State agency responsible for recovery, identification, and transportation of remains.
- AST can provide security at staging areas and command posts.
- AST is *not* involved in the investigation of marine casualties.

AST Resources.

- 17 troopers throughout Southeast Alaska.
- Maintain several small vessels in Southeast Alaska that could be used in a support capacity.

AST Initial Response.

- Provide agency representation on-site (i.e. as a member of the Away Team) or at one of the command posts (i.e. UCP or FCP).
- Maintain a representative at the SECC.
- Provide vessels support of response operations (provided they are available).

D. Special Response Initiatives:

ADEC Webpage for Significant Incidents.

During the *M/V Kuroshima* incident (i.e. a grounding and oil spill incident in Dutch Harbor during November 1997) the Unified Command (UC) used a webpage for the first time to disseminate status reports and future planning goals to the general public.

The webpage greatly helped the UC and forward command post (FCP) from being deluged by phone calls. The webpage quickly became the fastest way for the media to receive up-to-date spill information, maps, charts, and photographs. It also became a good location to place employment information during the incident.

Ground rules were established that ensured the posted information was strictly objective and required pre-approval by the responsible party, federal on-scene coordinator, and state on-scene coordinator prior to posting.

Costs associated with the *Kuroshima* webpage were approximately $2,000. Following the initial posting by ADEC, a contract person was hired to post daily situation reports and photographs. Updates took two-three hours. The webpage periodically posted new information through March 1998.

Following the incident the webpage has remained posted. ADEC and the CG continued to receive overwhelmingly positive feedback from interest parties.

Unresolved Issues:

- During a major cruise ship incident would a web page be helpful to disseminate information about response efforts (e.g. Posting situation reports, the passenger manifest, etc.)?
- What would the ground rules be for the webpage?

***M/V KENNICOTT*.**

The Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (AK DOT & PF), Division of the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) maintains and operates the state's ferry system.

M/V Kennicott, the newest vessel of the Marine Highway fleet, began service in the summer of 1998. Designed by Halter Marine and Glosten Associates of Seattle, Washington, the *Kennicott* is 382 feet long, 85 feet wide, with nine decks. She is driven by two 6,690 HP Wartsilla 32E diesel engines, and has a service speed of 16.75 knots. The vessel is ocean certified and is also designed to serve as a command and logistics center during an oil spill or other natural disaster. The ship has a capacity for 748 passengers, provides 320 berthing accommodations, and has space for 120 standard automobiles.

The *Kennicott*'s emergency response capabilities include:

- Lots of equipment storage space on the car deck.
- A self-unloader, with an elevator onboard, so the ferry can load and off-load anywhere there is pier access.
- An extensive communications suite (e.g. 8-channel satellite).
- A floating dock from the stern door that small boats can stage from.
- A decontamination station and showers on the car deck.
- A portable crane on the stern.
- A helicopter-landing pad suitable for an H-60 helicopter (located on top of the elevator tower). Note: the ferry does not have the capability to refuel helicopters.
- A command post capability in the forward lounge following the removable tables/chairs, and the installation of wiring for computer terminals, satellite telephones, etc..
- Hotel facilities for 750 passengers in various types of staterooms.
- Extensive capacity for storing foodstuffs.
- Limited water-making capability (emergency survival situations only).

Due to the anticipated costs associate with the mobilization of the *Kennicott*, the vessel would not be made available for small responses. However, it would be an ideal staging platform for an incident like the *Exxon Valdez* which occurred in 1989. ADES would be the conduit for such a request. Following the approval of the request by the governor, in consultation with the commissioner of the AK DOT & PF, the vessel would be diverted and an emergency response team would be activated.

AMHS has 8 other vessels which operate throughout the State on scheduled passenger routes. During a major emergency, these vessels could also be called upon

to assist. Additional vessel information is available on AMHS webpage at:
http://www.dot.state.ak.us/external/amhs/vessels/vsslinfo.html

LOCAL RESPONSE TO THE SCENARIO

Sections:
A. Juneau
B. Gustavus

Speakers Included: Mr. Dave Palmer (Juneau's City Manager) and Mr. Pedr Turner (Gustavus Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)).

A. Juneau:

The City and Borough of Juneau's (CBJ's) resources would be directed primarily to support the emergency medical response and to support passenger transfers once ashore.

- A city representative would be at the Unified Command Post (UCP), most likely the city manager or deputy city manager.
- The city would have its own Incident Command Center (City's ICC) set up at the fire station or the police station.
- A Bartlett Regional Hospital representative would probably be at the City's ICC during the initial response phase. It should be noted that the four heart attack victims in this scenario would take up all the beds in the hospital's emergency room. In addition, the hospital would need prior notification in order to have the necessary staff on hand before these victims arrived.
- An air medivac crew is available to go to the scene and provide care.
- The city's Parks and Recreation Department could provide passenger shelter, food, and phone support through Centennial Hall. The Red Cross would be asked to assist in this effort (e.g. blankets). Additional information on Red Cross capabilities in Southeast Alaska is provided in a separate section of this report.
- Capital Transit - Juneau's municipally owned bus system - could provide city buses to transport passengers and crew throughout the city. They currently operate 14 buses, 5 of which are handicap-accessible.
- A Juneau Airport representative would be at the City's ICC to assist in coordination of charter flights.
- The Juneau Police Department (JPD) would be available for security issues and can provide limited communications capabilities.
- The city's Finance Department would take care of purchasing records and tracking deployed city assets.
- The city's Risk Management Department would oversee safety concerns and related issues.

- City Public Works crews are available to be called out to ships to help with plumbing.

B. Gustavus:

Response efforts would focus on facilitating use of the airport and on coordinating locations to stage equipment and shelter people.

- The fire department has 15 people on the active duty roster and 10 people on the reserve roster.
- A radio dispatch system, a 1200-watt repeater system, covers most of the core area around Bartlett Cove and Icy Straits.
- Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (AK DOT & PF) maintains a shop of about 2,500 square feet at the airport.
- Airport Hanger Space: 16,000 square feet of heated hanger space is available at the airport, which could be used for emergency shelters. An additional 3,000-4,000 square feet of unheated hangar space is available for equipment.
- The school gym is also available with about 2,500 square feet. It is very close and accessible to the airport.
- Our community preparedness book lists the names of contractors that have heavy equipment and trucks in Gustavus (e.g. needed to haul spill equipment from a C-130 at the airport to response vessels in Bartlett Cove).

THE "AWAY TEAM" CONCEPT

Sections:

A. History of Development
B. The Basic Concept
C. Marine Fire Fighting Advisor Procedures

Speakers Included: CDR Dave Eley (Commanding Officer of CG MSO Juneau) and Mr. Galen Brevik (Alaska Department of Public Safety (DPS), Division of Fire Prevention).

A. History of Development:

The *C/S Universe Explorer* incident, which occurred in 1996, was the catalyst for the creation of the "Away Team" concept in Alaska. As the vessel transited toward Auke Bay, to off-load 1,000+ passengers following an onboard fire, they were still trying to assess the status of the vessel (i.e. the extent of the fire and injuries). At one point the CG Captain of the Port (COTP) got word that there had been a re-flash on the ship (which turned out not to be true) and he asked for marine fire fighters to go aboard the vessel to help assess the situation. 45 minutes later the master of the vessel was surprised to see a team of Juneau firefighters (8-12 people) appear on the bridge of the ship. The lack of good communications resulted in confusion and the unnecessary allocation of resources.

In the aftermath of the incident, the communication problem was addressed in a series of working groups with the CG, the City of Juneau, Industry representatives, and state officials. It became clear that a specialized interagency response team was necessary which could deploy to the bridge of a ship, help evaluate the situation, and communicate the ship's needs back to the shoreside response community.

The "Away Team" concept was first tested in April 1997 during the annual cruise ship exercise, which took place in Ketchikan. Participants felt the concept had merit, so following the exercise CG MSO Juneau started to develop a formalized policy.

B. The Basic Concept:

The Away Team's purpose is to facilitate State and Federal assistance to the vessel's master and to ensure that State and Federal concerns are passed directly to the

master. The team members are required to bring their own communications equipment so the vessel's communications systems are not over tasked.

A **CG marine inspector**, pre-designated by the COTP, would lead the team.

The remaining team make-up would be event specific, with the maximum number for members being five. The other possible positions include:

- **Emergency Medical Services (EMS) advisor.** The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DH&SS) - Division of Public Health would provide the team member.
- **Marine Fire Fighting Advisor.** The Alaska Department of Public Safety's (DPS's) Fire Marshal's Office would provide the team member.
- **Pollution Abatement Advisor.** The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) would provide the team member.
- **State SAR Coordinator/Law Enforcement Advisor.** The Alaska DPS-State Troopers would provide a state trooper as the team member.

C. Marine Fire Fighting Advisor Procedures:

The Fire Marshal's Office is fully supporting the concept and has outlined the following procedures to facilitate their participation.

For activation, the COTP would call the Fire Marshal's Office to request a marine fire fighter for the team. The closest state marine fire fighter would then be contacted and directed to the team's mobilization site.

The Fire Marshal's Office is creating a training booklet for its marine fire fighters that contains their duties as an Away Team member. An EMS Advisor booklet is also being developed in cooperation with DH&SS.

Copies of the draft Away Team instruction were made available to participants of the seminar. Additional copies can be requested from CG MSO Juneau or CGD17 (mpc).

COMMERCIAL OIL SPILL EQUIPMENT

Sections:

A. General Information
B. SEAPRO's Organization
C. Issues

Speaker: Mr. Jim Annichelli (General Manager for the Southeast Alaska Petroleum Resource Organization, Inc. (SEAPRO)).

A. General Information:

SEAPRO is a non-profit organization that was formed following the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in Alaska. It is comprised of 43 large and small company members throughout Southeast Alaska. These companies are required by state and federal governments to have plans, equipment, and trained personnel to respond to possible contingencies involving their transport and use of fuels. Member companies collectively meet these requirements through contracting with SEAPRO.

For non-members, SEAPRO is generally not authorized to respond to requests for assistance. However, SEAPRO will respond to requests for assistance for non-members if the request comes through the CG or the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC). Basically the CG or ADEC authorizes the activation by guaranteeing payment and ensuring protection from federal & state liability issues (e.g. required equipment levels as specified by the Alaska Unified Plan for oil and hazardous substance discharge/releases). SEAPRO's expenses would be paid by the government and the non-member would reimburse the authorizing agency's trust fund (e.g. the National Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF)) at a later date.

Federal activation of SEAPRO would <u>not</u> be considered a "federalization" of the spill. The activation would be considered an augmentation of the non-member's response capability (while they marshal their resources). The primary objects of the activation would be:

- Boom off the vessel
- Position at least two skimming systems inside the boom to try to collect the oil as it is coming from the vessel
- Activate teams for bird hazing

- Initiate planning for booming off of environmentally sensitive areas within a seven-mile radius of the vessel.

B. SEAPRO's Organization:

SEAPRO has a staff of five full-time employees dedicated to professional activities related to oil pollution response preparedness and training. They also maintain an extensive database of available equipment and trained personnel. Their home office is located in Ketchikan, AK.

Response Personnel.

- SEAPRO is in the midst of forming three spill management teams following the incident command system (ICS) structure. These teams will be located in Ketchikan, Sitka, and Juneau.
- 225+ trained rapid response personnel are available for activation from 15 Southeast Alaska communities. Personnel are HAZWOPER certified, per federal regulations, and are trained in oil pollution response (e.g. deploy boom, contain/collect/recover/store oil, decontamination, disposal, and planning).
- An additional 500+ trained personnel are available from SEAPRO's member companies.
- 6 wildlife response teams are also available. SEAPRO is working with the Alaska Raptor Center to develop additional capture and stabilization team capabilities.

Response Equipment.

- Flyaway response systems are pre-staged in Juneau, Sitka, and Ketchikan. They contain 820' of inflatable boom, 4 anchor systems, a Drum skimmer, and a100-bbl bladder. The on-scene arrival goal for this equipment is within 2-3 hours.
- SEAPRO also has various equipment pre-staged through Southeast Alaska:

    - 32,000 feet of containment boom.
    - 900,000 gallons of storage capacity.
    - 14 skimming and pumping systems.
    - 3 vessels.
    - 15 PPE and safety systems.
    - Weir skimmers and a foilex skimming system for heavy oil.

- A deployable communications system is also available.
- Through mutual aid agreements and partnerships with other large oil pollution response cooperatives in Alaska (i.e. SERVS, ACS, CISPRI, and CHADUX), SEAPRO has access to other types of skimming systems and barges.
- Many of the member companies have provided SEAPRO with detailed lists of equipment and resources that they are willing to make available.

C. Unresolved Issues:

- Implications on planning requirements need to be examined for SEAPRO contracting with non-members (e.g. legal obligations to members).
- The process for federal/state activation of SEAPRO resources on the behalf of a cruise operator needs to be defined.
- Planning standards (e.g. timeframe for on-scene deployment of equipment which leads to development of pre-positioning site requirements) for cruise ship responses do not exist. Currently there are national planning standards for oil barges and tank ships.
- Maintaining adequate numbers of trained response personnel and coordinating their mobilization is a continual challenge in Southeast Alaska.

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Sections:

A. Initial Response Options
B. Extended Response Options
C. The Exercise Scenario
D. Future Technologies

Speaker: CW03 Bill Benning (CGD17 Communications Center Juneau).

A. Initial Response Options (first 48-72 hours):

- The CG would attempt to exploit whatever mode the reporting source initially communicated with.
- The CG would focus communications around portable equipment and systems, something light that a person could carry (e.g. hand-held VHF-FM radios, cellular phones, and INMARSAT V/M).
- The CG recognizes that Industry responders will take first precedent for the ship's limited communications lines, therefore Away Team members are required to bring their own communications equipment out to the vessel in order to communicate back to shore.
- The CG would also attempt to coordinate capabilities with other federal, state, and local agencies.
- Utilize the VHF-FM national distress system, if it is accessible to the area.
- Position a communications vessel on-scene (e.g. other cruise ships, fishing vessels, charter boats, a CG cutter, etc.).
- Establish communications via a CG C-130 communication platform launched from Kodiak, AK. On-scene time will be limited based on the distance to the vessel and the aircraft's fuel capacity.
- Cellular phone communications are not expected to be reliable for extended responses. The systems in Southeast Alaska are old systems and do not have the capabilities of the newer systems in the Lower-48 states. As a result cellular traffic would most likely overwhelm the system during a response. In addition, cellular phone coverage in Southeast Alaska is not comprehensive. In fact the CG's VHF national distress system encompasses a much greater area in Southeast Alaska than the cellular systems.

B. Extended Response Options (operations beyond 72 hours):

- Explore using the MF and HF systems in Juneau.
- Establish a VHF-UHF remote repeater system. The CG successfully tested their system last year in Gilbert Bay. Future tests are also being developed.
- Mobilize the CG's transportable communication center, which is stored in Sacramento, CA. Mobilization time and logistics would be a consideration.
- Investigate AT&T Alascom mobile earth station capabilities.

C. The Exercise Scenario:

In the case of Glacier Bay, INMARSAT should not be considered a "silver bullet." The satellite is not directly overhead, therefore communications require a clear path to the southwest (i.e. depending on location, elevations will block the signal). VHF-UHF communications in the bay will not work to the southwest, but will work through a repeater/vessel system to the east. Russell Island is in a perfect position to set up a repeater station; either off the island with a communications vessel or right on the island.

D. Future Technologies:

A future communication system called "Iridium North America" will be on line by October 1998. The system utilizes 66 satellites to make satellite voice phone calls available anywhere in the world.

VESSEL EVACUATION

Sections:

A. Types of Vessel Evacuations
B. Shoreside Support Considerations
C. Passenger/Crew Accountability

Speaker: Mr. Kirby Day (Princess Tours - Southeast Alaska), CAPT Graham Burton (Princess Cruises), Mr. Don Habeger (Cruise Line Agency of Alaska), CAPT Cees Delstra (Holland America Cruises), Mr. Pedr Turner (Gustavus LEPC), Mr. Chuck Cohen (Cohen & Associates Legal Firm), LCDR Dave Stalfort (Executive Officer of CG MSO Juneau).

A. Types of Vessel Evacuations:

Reasons for Evacuations. The participants generally agreed that the removal of large numbers of passengers and crew from a vessel should be considered a last resort. Reasons for the removal of passengers and crew in recent contingencies have centered on the loss of passenger shipboard services and/or the inability of the ship to meet it's touring schedule. The CG expressed the concern that the decision to stay or evacuate should be made in a coordinated and timely fashion.

> CAPT Burton (paraphrased summary): I was always taught, as a training officer, that your best lifeboat was the ship that you were already on. So a ship's master will be reluctant to abandon ship unless it becomes necessary. It could become necessary for several reasons, the most immediate reason would be that the ship was sinking or was on fire. However, during our recent experiences in Alaska the passengers and crew have not been evacuated from the ship due to fire or flooding. They have been evacuated because the ship lost some of the passenger services or the ship could not continue its schedule due to repairs. ... Obviously, if there are people injured in whatever incident it might be, it is important to get them off. Traditionally, you've got a very small number of people to get off in a hurry.

Spectrum of Evacuations. While it was generally agreed that each event would be different, removals have historically fallen along a definable spectrum:

- **To the right (least likely to occur) ... A total, emergency evacuation of the vessel within a short time of the incident.** The evacuation would be executed by using lifeboats and liferafts. Other assisting vessels would most likely arrive following the loading of the lifeboats & liferafts. The decision process to evacuate would be clear and immediate. The master would make the determination. The

removals of this of this type are extremely rare. The last event of this type to occur in Alaska was the *C/S Prinsendam* fire in 1980.

> CAPT Delstra (paraphrased summary): For the Glacier Bay scenario - If we get into a situation that we have to move people immediately, within the hour of the accident with nobody there to help us, then what's going to happen is that the ship has sixteen lifeboats in which all the passengers are going to go. Then we have 700 crewmembers that will come down in liferafts of 25 persons each. … There are 24 liferafts and 16 lifeboats floating around in Glacier Bay, with the lifeboats keeping them all together. … Now Glacier Bay happens to be a pretty sheltered area, so the company is probably not worried that they're going to lose any of these rafts or lifeboats. Which if you have a situation in open sea, that is a problem because the rafts could go off in the different directions, and you would have to really look for them. … I venture that in the height of the cruise ship season it would be less than 12 hours to get a cruise ship to Glacier Bay. … in the meantime other vessels would start to assist. If worse comes to worst, the lifeboats could start moving in the direction of Gustavus. A lifeboat has 24 hours of fuel at six miles per hour on board. You heard this morning that it is about 48 miles from Gustavus. If a lifeboat only does the minimum speed of six knots, it would take them 8 hours to get there. … Then we have the liferafts. The liferafts would be floating around with the remaining crew on board. The crew, however, are trained and know what to expect. It's not going to kill them if they spend 12 hours in a raft. There is food, water, and medicine in each raft. Within the next 12 hours, I expect we would be able to pick up the crew out of these rafts.

- **In the middle … An orderly disembarkation of the passengers and crew at sea**. Following the casualty the vessel's condition would limit its ability to safely navigate and/or present onboard safety hazards for several days. The removal of passengers and crew would be necessary but not immediate. Injured personnel would be removed 1st by emergency responders (e.g. CG Helicopters). The remaining passengers and crew would be removed in accordance with a jointly coordinated timeline (i.e. based on the master's recommendation, available resources, number of disembarkees, weather, distance to appropriate shoreside logistics sites, etc.). The decision process would not be clear-cut and the timing could become critical (e.g. anticipated arrival of bad weather). The determination would involve a coordinated effort between the master, the cruise line operator, and the CG Captain of the Port (COTP). The most recent events of this type in Alaska have been the *C/S Yorktown Clipper* grounding in 1993 and the *C/S Regent Star* fire in 1995.

> Mr. Day (paraphrased summary): For the Glacier Bay scenario - As LCDR Stalfort said, every incident is going to be different. Knowing we have to get the passengers/crew off the ship - we may in fact start taking these people off by catamaran to Juneau (e.g. Taku Cruises Alan Marine vessels) … . In this scenario we're not saying we're going to use catamarans all the time. We're saying that might be one component. Another cruise ship in the area may be another component. Under an ideal situation, we would want bring them into a private dock facility. Taku Cruises Alan Marine's facility would work; it's secure and we can operate 8-10 motor coaches at one time on the dock out there.

Vessel disembarkation at sea to smaller commercial vessels would involve a large timeframe (e.g. additional time required to arrive on-scene and limitations in numbers of passenger which could be transferred).

In the Glacier Bay scenario: If Allen Marine's eight vessels (with approximately 1,100 seats) were used, less than half the passengers and crew would be initially picked up. The remaining people would have another 11-14 hours to wait onboard until the smaller vessels could return.

- **To the left (more likely to occur) … Following the casualty the vessel would transit to the nearest port to disembark the passengers and crew.** Timing would be less critical based on the continued stability and mobility of the vessel. Injured personnel would be removed 1st by emergency responders (e.g. CG Helicopter). The determination of where and when to move the vessel would involve a coordinate effort between the master, the cruise line operator, and the COTP. The most recent events of this type in Alaska have been the *C/S Nieuw Amsterdam* grounding in 1994, the *C/S Star Princess* grounding in 1995 and the *C/S Universe Explorer* fire in 1996.

  > Mr. Day (paraphrased summary): With *C/S Star Princess* … It happened in a situation such that the Coast Guard and the company officials decided the passengers could stay on board comfortably. We had a very controlled situation whereby we could go to work in Seattle, get charter flights coming in, get the people processed orderly off the ship right to the airport and off they went. It sounds orderly — it was orderly chaos. But it actually worked very well.

Unresolved Issues.

- If a large number of injuries occur and the passengers and crew remain onboard for an extended period of time, it may be advantageous to move extra medical personnel out to the vessel (i.e. a Medical Away Team). It was noted that the *C/S Universe Explorer* response may have benefited from such a team. Larger vessels generally have one physician, two-three nurses, four emergency/critical-care beds, and at least five extra cabins for medical use.

- Luggage transfers, following the passenger/crew transfers, would be a major logistical undertaking for industry.

B. Shoreside Support Considerations:

Community Impact Considerations.

- The availability of Industry and/or City ground transportion resources.

  For the Glacier Bay Scenario: Princess Tours and Gray Line of Alaska have over 100 employees and 75-80 motor coaches in Juneau. In addition, Capital Transit - Juneau's municipally owned bus system - operates 14 buses.

- The airport's ability to handle large aircraft (e.g. 737s). Large airports in Southeast Alaska are located in Juneau, Sitka, and Ketchikan.
- The ability to temporarily shelter the passengers and crew should weather restrict air traffic. Juneau, Sitka, and Ketchikan have large community/civic centers. These communities, as well as others in Southeast Alaska, could also utilize public schools and community meeting locations for shelters.

For the Glacier Bay scenario: Gustavus was not generally favored as the 1st choice for passengers/crew logistical coordination for the following reasons:

- Airport operations are limited due to the lack of runway lights.
- Large aircraft would require a refueling stop in another Southeast Alaska airport before they could reach the Lower-48. This issue results from fuel/passenger loading limitations associated with the length of the runway.
- The community would be hard pressed to shelter the passengers/crew if weather restricted air traffic.

Distance from on-scene to the community.

For the Glacier Bay scenario: During a contingency involving passengers and crew in lifeboats and liferafts, Gustavus might become the primary shoreside coordination location simple because it is the closest community (e.g. searching for the liferafts/lifeboats might limit the transit capabilities of response assets.)

Community Coordination.

- Airport Manager coordination would be critical for bringing in large commercial aircraft, looking for local charter flights, and developing workable schedules.
- Port Director coordination would be critical if a City facility was the best choice for disembarking the passengers and transferring them by buses/motor coaches.
- The City and Borough Manager, the police department, and/or fire department would be critical for traffic control and security.

- The Red Cross would be critical for coordinating emergency shelter operations. Additional information on Red Cross capabilities in Southeast Alaska is provided in a separate section of this report.

C. Passenger/Crew Accountability:

During the months of January through March 1998, CG MSO Juneau, cruise ship industry representatives, and City and Borough of Juneau (CBJ) officials met to discuss passenger/crew accountably procedures during an emergency evacuation/disembarkation of a cruise ship. Passenger/crew accountability had been identified during previous exercises and incidents as a major concern.

Though it was recognized that every scenario would be different, the participants agreed that it was important to create a basic plan for general planning purposes. The plan relied on a joint organization (i.e. a Unified Command (UC)) which could coordinate with the vessel's master to safely execute the evacuation/disembarkation.

The draft proposal was provided to the seminar's participants, additional copies are available from CG MSO Juneau.

Unresolved Issues:

- Availability and distribution of vessel manifests.
- Passenger accountability ashore will be difficult (i.e. Once passengers are ashore they are free to go where they want and therefore may not check-in at the emergency shelter).
- If a UC is not formed, who leads this process and what are the recognized standards to be met?

PORT AND VESSEL SECURITY

Sections:

A. Passenger Terminal Security Issues for Southeast Alaska

B. Vessel Security Programs

Speaker: CDR Dave Eley (CG MSO Juneau), CAPT Ted Thompson (International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL)), and CAPT Graham Burton (Princess Cruises).

A. Passenger Terminal Security Issues for Southeast Alaska:

Regulations went into effect in October 1996 that required vessel and port security plans for designated "passenger terminals" in the U.S.. Although Southeast Alaska does not have passenger terminals by definition, the CG and Industry have worked closely together to developing plans that address the security needs of Alaskan ports. The following are initiatives which have been established:

- Each vessel maintains a ship specific security plan.
- Cruise ships have developed contacts and working relationships with local law enforcement officials. The CG recommends onboard security officers meet with local law enforcement officials on their inaugural voyage to Alaskan ports each year.
- Cruise Line Agency of Alaska (CLAA) has developed a list of emergency contact phone numbers for the various municipalities, boroughs, and cruise ships.
- The CG has coordinated with Southeast Alaskan ports to develop contingency plans that restrict dock access during security events.

The CG receives heightened security alerts through its Washington headquarters, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies. During alerts the information is passed on to Industry and the ports to coordinate security measures.

B. Vessel Security Programs:

With cruise line operations occurring in as many as 300 different ports worldwide each year, ships are vulnerable a myriad maritime crimes; including terrorism, criminal attack, theft of goods and services, stowaways, fraud, etc. To preserve the fun and stress-free image of cruising, considerable effort and resources are employed in the protection of these operations.

Industry security programs concentrate on the following:

- Physical security of ships in port is enhanced with metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive detectors, and uniformed guards.
- Internal and external audits are conducted annually of vessel security programs.
- Ship specific security plans have been developed in accordance with CG requirements.
- Ship access is being increasingly controlled by photo identification systems for all passengers and crew.
- Cruise operators liaise with port officials, the CG, and law enforcement agencies on a routine basis. The Maritime Security Council, the Maritime Counter-Terrorism Working Group, and the International Council of Cruise Lines' (ICCL's) security group are examples of groups that facilitate continuing coordination and information sharing among these organizations.
- Port surveys and security audits are conducted annually. In the last three years 120 ports in over 60 countries have been audited.
- Ship security personnel are highly trained and experienced.
- Random drug tests are conducted on at least 10% of the crew annually. In addition, equipment is onboard for drug and alcohol testing in the event of a maritime casualty.
- Luggage and stores screening is conducted based on the current threat assessment level. Agreements with airlines, airports, and ports have also been coordinated for luggage arrivals/departures.
- The U.S. Department of Transportation's ad hoc government/industry working group for intelligence sharing meets on a quarterly basis to discuss worldwide security issues and specific threats. During a serious threat, intelligence is passed through the CG Captains of the Port (COPT) to the various responsible parties.
- Restricted areas (e.g. engine room, the steering gear, the bridge, communications center, etc.) have been established and are strictly enforced.
- Ships conduct regular onboard security patrols (24 hours a day).
- Passenger profiling is conducted, in conjunction with government agencies, in order to concentrate security efforts on those passengers most likely to be a risk.
- Shore excursion security concerns are included in the port audit process.
- Training programs are conducted for security officers, deck watchmen, and some deck officers.
- In 1996, ICCL developed a model security plan to assist cruise operators in developing their own plans. ICCL members met with COTPs in various locations around the U.S. to ensure that ship and port concerns were being adequately addressed. As a result, the review and approval of industry plans was greatly streamlined.
- In 1997, industry hosted the first conference on cruise ship counter-terrorism. Military intelligence and government agencies from the U.S., U.K., Norway, and Canada participated.

OPEN FORUM

Sections:

A. National Weather Service (NWS)
B. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
C. National Park Service - Glacier Bay
D. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)

Speakers: Listed below.

A. National Weather Service:

Mr. Robert Kanan (paraphrased summary): Having listened to the presentations, I am concerned that the resources of the National Weather Service may be over looked during your response efforts. As we all know, once an incident like this happens, one of the first things you're going to be looking for is accurate weather information. Every responding resource is going to come by water and by air, and you're going to need a lot of special support in the way of forecasts. I think it's important that all responders know how to get a hold of this weather support. …

The National Weather Service has over 30 years experience with the incident command system, primarily with wildfires. We would be one of the technical specialists that would be in the planning section. I recommend adding this position to existing plans in Alaska. …

Another point I'd like to make is that it should be a high priority for whoever gets on-scene first to get a weather observation; even if it is only an estimated wind speed, wind direction, and estimated cloud heights. That information needs to get back to the NWS technical specialist at the UCP. With this information in hand, two important things can happen. First, the NWS can incorporate the information into our national database so that anybody can get a hold of it; specifically the CG and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Secondly, we can develop special forecasts for the area of the response. …

B. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service:

Ms. Deborah Rudis (paraphrased summary): We really appreciate the opportunity for the Fish & Wildlife Service to be here at this seminar. I want to make a few comments on the potential magnitude of an oil spill in Glacier Bay, such as the scenario has presented. I think some of you were involved in the *Exxon Valdez* cleanup and realize the long-term issues involved. During this seminar your major emphasis has been on personal safety and human life. Understandably that's very important and of course the most critical issue. However, as soon as the people are safe and the vessel is stabilized, you will have to immediately deal with oiled wildlife and oiled habitat. The oil effects and response are going to last a lot longer …

Several issues will quickly become very important to the responders:

- Increasing numbers of technical, environmental questions are going to be asked by the press.
- The decision to use or not use dispersants will have to be coordinated.
- Collecting oil from an ice filled bay will have to be addressed (e.g. How do you pick up oiled ice? Can you boom the oiled ice to contain it in the bay?).
- Coastal assessment teams and support vessels are going to have to be organized and dispatched to the field.
- Wildlife carcasses are going to have to be retrieved and stored in major freezer vans. Personnel are going to be needed to catalogue these animals. Where will this function occur?
- Volunteer management will become a major management task (e.g. disseminating information, organizing teams, verifying training qualifications, etc.).
- There may be the need for a wildlife rehabilitation facility. Where will that be placed?
- The natural resource damage assessment will also involve a lot of staff.

C. National Park Service:

Dr. Larry Basch (paraphrased summary): I would like to support what Deb said regarding a long-term oil spill response. Glacier Bay is a pristine and world-class site, but it's not atypical for Southeast Alaska where cruise ships and other vessels ply the waters. The major consequences that Deb outlined are real and significant.

Another possibility, even with a relatively small spill of 100,000 gallons as we're talking about in this scenario, is that the area would be closed for some time to come due to clean up and various other activities. The likelihood that the vessels of this type would be excluded from the area and other areas around it for the duration of the season and possibly future seasons is probably quite high. So the economic impacts to not just the local area of Gustavus and the industry per se, but also the region, are potentially quite substantial.

I would also like to say, following up what Bob Kanan had to say, that not only do we know essentially nothing about the local weather conditions in this and other areas of Glacier Bay, but we also know very little about the local currents. Even though we have models that predict where the oil spill is going to go in a given length of time, the accuracy of these models in not known. We also know very little about how products such as Bunker C behave in waters like these (e.g. how they interact with potential fresh water lenses and ice). All these things may be worthwhile trying to consider in future scenarios and seminars.

Mr. Randy King (paraphrased summary): ... One of the steps that the Park Service is looking at is using this forum as a launching step for a Risk Assessment Plan for the general park area; not only Glacier Bay National Park but for the areas of Cross Sound and Icy Straits. We've been working with the Coast Guard about that and some representatives from the cruise industry, as well as tour boats. Conceptually we are talking about doing a more detailed follow-up plan which would identify specific response requirements and needs. Perhaps that might help us do a better job of pre-planning for potential events that might occur in the area. I want to thank everyone here on behalf of the Park Service - I think this is a wonderful first step in doing a more detailed plan that would address response capabilities and pre-planning, not only for the park but for this middle area of Southeast Alaska.

D. Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation (ADEC):

Mr. Ron Flinn (paraphrased summary): In support of what the Fish & Wildlife Service and Park Service people have said, Glacier Bay is a really sensitive area. All of Southeast Alaska is sensitive, and this is probably the primo sensitive area.

We've talked a lot about forming the Unified Command (UC) with the Responsible Party (RP), the CG, and the State. Of course that's going to happen as soon as it can be put together. As we have discussed it sometimes takes a few hours for all these people to come together. Considering how important this area is, as far as a state resource and a national resource, the state — and I think the CG too — would respond to the spill immediately. We'd be mobilizing our resources and our personnel, assuming that we're the first ones who can get there, and we're going to start responding to the spill, even if the RP is not there yet.

Now this doesn't mean that we're going to take over the spill. What it means is we're going to try to augment the response as much as we can until the RP can get there with their response capability. They might beat us there, and that would be fine. Then we would do whatever we could do to augment their response. I think that we all have to understand that as far as the state is concerned, we would respond immediately,

and we would employ as much manpower and equipment initially as we had available until the RP is able to catch up and take over on the spill.

AMERICAN RED CROSS (ARC)

Information Source: Ms. Lana Tolls (ARC Executive Director for the Southeast Alaska Chapter) - 16-Feb-99.

Disaster Mission. The ARC's primary mission during disasters is to provide initial shelter, food, and clothing for victims. In addition they can provide limited mental health services to help victims and responders cope with the incident. The Southeast Alaska Chapter is located in Juneau and consists of 1 full time director and 4 part-time staff members. Additional volunteers may be available in other communities (e.g. currently there are 50 volunteers in Juneau and 10 in Ketchikan).

During a cruise ship contingency the ARC sees their primary roles as assisting in sheltering passengers and assisting in providing mental health services. Providing food and clothing are not anticipated as issues for the ARC due to Industry's ability and desire to fully support the passengers.

For contingency responses in Southeast Alaska, the Juneau Office can be contacted seven days a week, 24 hours a day at **(907) 789-2808**.

Sheltering. Shelter capabilities vary by community. Convention facilities, schools, and churches are the primary locations for shelters. With the exception of convention centers, most facilities in Southeast Alaska can only shelter from 100 to 200 persons at a time. The ARC could coordinate the availability of shelters during a response.

Shelter supplies, which are stored in Juneau and Ketchikan, consist of cots and blankets (i.e. Juneau with 350 cots and 500 blankets; Ketchikan with 60 cots). "Comfort Kits", which provide toiletry items to victims, are not currently stored in Southeast Alaska due to their short shelf life. ARC tents are not available in Alaska.

Mental Health. Volunteers who are certified as Mental Health Counselors are available in Juneau and Ketchikan (i.e. currently 8 in Juneau and 10 in Ketchikan).

Logistics. Transportation of supplies to Southeast communities outside of Juneau and Ketchikan would be coordinated with the Alaska Department of Emergency Services (ADES).

Additional supplies can be requested from the ARC Anchorage Chapter or the Lower-48. However, the effectiveness of requesting additional supplies during a cruise ship

response may be limited due to the logistics involved (i.e. the passengers and crew will most likely depart for the Lower-48 before the supplies arrive).

CRUISE SHIP CONTINGENCIES IN ALASKA
(1993-1998)

Information Source: CGD17 After Action Report Files.

Contingency Summary
(1993-1998)

	Yorktown Clipper	Nieuw Amsterdam	Star Princess	Regent Star	Universe Explorer
Date	**Aug-93**	**Aug-94**	**Jun-95**	**Jul-95**	**Jul-96**
Cause	**Grounding**	**Grounding**	**Grounding**	**Fire**	**Fire**
Vessel Age	**5 yrs**	**11 yrs**		**38 yrs**	**38 yrs**
OS Weather	**Good**	**Fog**	**Good**	**Good**	**Good**
Location	**Glacier Bay**	**Gravina Pt. Nichols Passage**	**Poundstone Rock Lynn Canal**	**Knight Is Passage PWS**	**Enroute Glacier Bay**
Passengers/ Crew	**134/42**	**1,214/521**	**1,568/632**	**850/434**	**732/338**
Abandon Ship	**Y**	**N**	**N**	**Y**	**N**
Injuries	**0**	**6 (minor)**	**0**	**7**	**73**
Deaths	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**5**
Oil Pollution	**50 gallons (diesel)**	**250 gallons (lube oil)**	**Negligible**	**N/A**	**N/A**

REFERENCE LIST

- **Southeast Cruise Ship Information Binder** (published and annually updated by CLAA)
- **Southeast Alaska Voluntary Waterways Guide** (published and annually updated by CG MSO Juneau)
- **Basic Medical Resources - Ports Served by Cruise Line Vessels** (published and annually updated by Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Section of Community Health and Emergency Medical Services)
- **Away Team Instruction** (draft - developed by CG MSO Juneau)
- **Passenger Accounting Procedures** (draft - developed by CG MSO Juneau)
- **ICS Training Manuals** (materials available through CGD17 (mpc))
- **Alaska Unified Plan** (for oil and hazardous substance discharge/releases). The Unified Plan can be viewed online at: www.akrrt.org/UnifiedPlan/unifplan.htm
- **Sample Salvage Plan**. A sample salvage plan can be obtained via the internet from the CG's Marine Safety Center (MSC) at: www.uscg.mil/hq/msc/salvage.htm

ATTENDEE LIST

The following people were in attendance:

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Pellet, Warren	IND - SEAPRO	(907) 225-7002
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Cohen, Charles	IND (legal) - Cohen & Associates	(907) 463-5078
Ray, Herbert H., Jr.	IND (legal) - Keesal, Young & Logan - Anchorage	(907) 279-9696
Woodell, Michael	IND (legal) - Keesal, Young & Logan - Anchorage	(907) 279-9696
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Jaeger, Bud	LOCAL - American Red Cross - Juneau, AK	(907) 789-2808
Tolls, Lana	LOCAL - American Red Cross - Juneau, AK	(907) 789-2808
Gast, Sandra	LOCAL - Bartlett Regional Hospital - Juneau, AK	(907) 586-2611
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Doyle, Mike	LOCAL - Capitol City Fire & Rescue - Juneau, AK	(907) 586-5322
Graham, Joe	LOCAL - CBJ Docks & Harbors	(907) 586-5255
Palmer, Dave	LOCAL - City & Borough of Juneau, AK	(907) 586-5385
Brown, Deena	LOCAL - EMS Contractor	
Berner, Tom	LOCAL - Gustavus LEPC - Gustavus, AK	(907) 697-2222
Turner, Pedr	LOCAL - Gustavus LEPC - Gustavus, AK	(907) 697-2222
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Leatherberry, Les	STATE - ADEC - Juneau	(907) 465-5357
Matson, Bob	STATE - ADEC - Juneau	(907) 465-5349
Pilot, Art	STATE - ADEC - Juneau	(907) 465-5357
Warren, Roy	STATE - ADEC - Juneau	(907) 465-5242
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Monsen, Nils (F-SGT)	STATE - Alaska State Troopers - Anchorage, AK	(907) 345-8417
Tyler, Bill SGT	STATE - Alaska State Troopers - Anchorage, AK	(907) 345-8417
Norris, Doug LT	STATE - Alaska State Troopers - Ketchikan, AK	(907) 225-5118
Brevik, Gaylen	STATE - Division of Fire Prevention	(907) 465-3117
Schreck, Steve	STATE - Division of Fire Prevention	(907) 465-3117

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Participating organizations will be notified of the final report via e-mail and may download copies of the report from the internet at: www.akrrt.org/cruisex99

One paper copy of this report will also be available to representatives of the below organizations at the next Alaskan Cruisex in March of 1999. Following the event, organizations that were not able to attend will be mailed a copy of the report.

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National Park Service - Glacier Bay National Park	1
National Weather Service (NWS)	2
CG AIRSTA Sitka	3
CGD17 Command Center Juneau	4
CGD17 Plans & Exercises (mpc)	5
CG MSO Juneau	6
CG MSO Anchorage	7
CG MSO Valdez	8
CG Pacific Area (Pp) - Alameda, CA	9
CG COMDT (G-OPF)	10
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